Pushing the Limits: US – Iranian Brinkmanship in the Gulf

Strategic Impasse

that is Unlikely to Change Absent Third-Party Intervention

Pushing the Limits: US – 

Iranian Brinkmanship in the Gulf
Brookings Doha Center

October 20, 2019

Intercontinental Hotel, Doha Qatar

Three panelists expressed pessimism and pragmatism last week in assessing the current tensions between the US and Iran. 

The moderator, Ali Fathollah-Nejad, Visiting Fellow, Brookings Doha Center, began the program by giving a brief summary of recent actions taken by both belligerents. He described President Trump’s unilateral withdrawal of the US from the nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In 2018, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on Iran, that among others things, affected Iran's ability to sell and export oil and natural gas. While European countries promised to mitigate the economic impact of these sanctions, their promises fell short. 

As a consequence, Iran adopted a “maximum resistance strategy.” 

He asked: What does the future hold? Military actions? Or, negotiations? What is the role of other countries in helping to resolve the escalating dispute?

Suzanne Maloney

Deputy Director of the Foreign Policy Program

Brookings Institute

The first panelist quickly displayed her deep knowledge of the regional conflict by saying that she now is very pessimistic that the parties can find a solution. They are at a strategic impasse prone to escalation by both sides. 

She stated that the JCPOA, while less than perfect, still worked to defer tension between the US and Iran. The parties implemented it in 2016, and it represented the first diplomatic breakthrough since the Tehran embassy hostage taking in 1979. The JCPOA negotiation represented the efforts of many experts. 

Many saw it as a start of a more warm relationship. 

But, “hope shattered.” Iranians expected more relief from sanctions. Washington, D.C. elites saw it as tying US hands. 

Even without regard for Trump’s withdrawal of the US from the deal, many people had concerns about its longevity. These concerns existed before Trump’s election to president. 

While he made the JCPOA a point of conversation in his campaign, most of his supporters have little understanding of the region or the deal. But, the rhetoric resonated with Republican voters and legislators. 

While Trump is on his fourth national security advisor (a historic record) and his second secretary of state, they have all shared very hawkish views about Iran. They saw the US giving away too much while getting too little. They expressed concern that Iran had retained too much leeway to continue to develop its nuclear capabilities. They also thought the deal, focused on nuclear issues, neglected other concerns, including Iran’s ballistic missiles. 

In contrast, the Obama administration saw the deal as a starting point, despite the lack of comprehensiveness. Democrats, had they won the 2016 election, expected to negotiate additional issues. 

Israel and Saudi Arabia, yet other stakeholders, criticized the deal. 

After his election, Trump also imposed the “Muslim ban,” which had a disproportionate effect on Iranians visiting the US. He then abandoned the JCPOA and imposed sanctions.

Maloney suggested that we have seen both success and problems since then. 

The US Treasury Department used it counter-terrorism authority to cut off Iran from the international banking community. As a result, these unilateral sanctions have imposed pain on the Iranian economy. 

She noted that Iran exercised, to the surprise of many, “strategic patience” for a year. She called this response “quite outstanding.” 

At the May 2019 anniversary of the 1979 Iranian embassy hostage crisis, Trump said he would drive Iranian oil exports to zero. 

Iran pushed back. 

• In May 2019, Iran sabotaged a Saudi pipeline. 
• In June 2019, Iran attacked two tankers in the Gulf of Oman carrying Saudi, Qatari, and UAE petroleum products. 
• In June 2019, Iran shot down a US drone.
• In July 2019, Iran attacked small ships in the Persian Gulf.
• In July 2019, Iran detained a British tanker.
• Then, in September 2019, Iran attacked the state-owned Saudi Aramco oil processing facilities at Abqaiq and Khuris. 

Trump, on the other hand, has often used Twitter to announce he will not respond with military force.  [See here for more on his threat and its walk-back.  See here for the threat following the September attack.] 

These actions, show that Iran can make good on its own threats to harm commerce in the Persian Gulf and disrupt the flow of petroleum products from the region. The message it is sending? The countries in the rest of the region are not safe to export their oil if Iran is not safe to export its oil. 

Maloney calls the current situation a “strategic impasse.” While sanctions have “devastated” the Iranian economy, the US has experienced little blow-back from its more belligerent policy. Consequently, the US can enforce the policy indefinitely. 

So, how does Iran respond? Maloney mentioned, without explication, that Iran is approaching another deadline. 

Importantly, Maloney sees little capacity in, or intent of, the Trump administration to enter negotiations. Throughout her opening remarks, she used a number of carefully chosen adjectives when describing Trump and his administration. Nonetheless, she clearly conveyed a lack of confidence in the ability of Trump to deal with the impasse with any skill.

Abbas Maleki

Professor of Energy Policy

Sharif University of Technology

Tehran, Iran 

Dr. Maleki began by saying that the 40 years of mutual hostilities have reinforced negative perceptions and ignorance on both sides of the dispute. These perceptions affect policy-making and cut off policy options. 

He next discussed the differences between coercive diplomacy and deterrence diplomacy. One enlists persuasion to get the desired behaviors. The other uses threats of reprisal to motivate actions. 

Iran views US efforts as deterrence diplomacy attempting to make Iran a subject of US power, as it was before the revolution. Iran sees a lack of good faith. 

Washington sees Iran as implacable in negotiations, while Iran sees negotiations as offering little flexibility. Both countries’ leaders have little leeway to approach each other. Iran believes the pressure of deterrence diplomacy is not effective. Iran cannot survive without its defense system, including its ballistic missiles. Its security self-sufficiency reflects its inability to obtain advance technology from the West. 

Iran wants to avoid a bloody war, but does not expect any relief from sanctions. Accordingly, it is happy to preserve the current status quo. The US also seems content to maintain the current status quo. 

Each country has its proxies in the region. Iran has Hamas, Hezbollah, the Islamic Jihad, its presence in southern Iraq, a relationship with Syria’s Alawite-aligned Assad, India, Russia and China. Iran views the relationships with India, Russia, and China as a shift in trade relations, away from the West. The US sees these proxy relationships as evidence of Iran’s expansionist ambitions.  

Iran sees the US as a regional interloper. 

Each country sees the other country as creating threats on a daily basis, to which the countries must respond. 

Yet, people continue to try to restart negotiations: 

• In August 2019, Iran's foreign minister attended the G7 meeting in France for side talks on peace at the invitation of French President Macron.
• In September, 2019, Iran invited peace talks. 
• In September 2019, Iran's President addressed the UN continuing the call for dialogue.  

The parties have made progress on a framework for talks and for rebuilding trust. The efforts should emphasize common interests and values, which Dr. Maleki said are broader than many people might imagine. 

He suggests that Iran can: 

• Open lines of communication.
• Support diplomacy. 
• Build confidence, especially in the Persian Gulf. 
• Use think tanks and other institutions to develop policy. 
• Use Track 2 diplomacy. 

Omar Ayasrah 

journalist and writer 

Mr. Ayasrah started by saying that the US-Iranian conflict is “very strange.” After 40 years of sanctions, Iran has survived and developed. It has expanded into Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon. 

Unlike US actions against Sadam Hussein in Iraq, which “crushed it,” the US has not tried to crush the Iranian leadership. Iran’s capabilities are ongoing. 

He asserts that Iran does not believe a regional war will happen. 

He next focused on the role of Israel as a big player in the dispute. Its interests could tip thinking in Washington and Tehran. The US might defend it with military intervention. Withdrawal from the nuclear deal benefited Israel.   [But see this October 2019 article.]

If the West seeks a comprehensive war, designed to topple the Iranian regime, Iran will not accept it. 

Ayasrha detects a change in strategy. He does not know if it is “just Trump” or a broader US shift. 

He asks: “To what extent will the US defend its allies?” 

Iran now understands the limits of Trump’s threats. 

He noted that most Arab countries are not picking sides. 

We may see an ongoing separation between nuclear and ballistic missile issues. 

The big question is whether the US will accept Iran as a regional power, as it has accepted Turkey in that role. 

Thus, the US assesses Iran differently than other countries do. 

The current stalemate is rationale. Neither country can execute a regional war. 

Will a settlement of the dispute be a detriment to some Arab states? 

He called the US a “savage country” in its policy execution. 

He, too lacks optimism that the parties will find agreement in the next 3 to 6 months. He wonders how US policy will play out during that time, especially with the recent installation of US troops in Saudi Arabia (which Saudi Arabia will pay for, according to Trump).

Deputy Director Maloney: 

The US and Iran both believe that time is on its side. The US can keep unilateral sanctions in place without any blow-back. It sees the sanctions as starving resources to hinder Iran's expansionist ambitions. 

Iran has survived the worst of the effects of the sanctions. Yes, the economy has contracted 10 percent this year, but it has stabilized. Iranians have not held protests, labor strikes, or other forms of backlash against in their government. 

But, the attacks have generated a diplomatic pause in Europe. Countries there see themselves as being forced to choose sides. So, it is not they will start negotiations between the countries. 

She sees little capacity in Washington to engage in diplomacy. Trump can't rebrand the JCPOA and roll-it out as a win. Republicans will not put up with that. 

So, the question becomes: Who will capitulate first? 

Neither country has confidence in a small transactional deal focused on narrow issues. 

Need to go back to 1979 and engage in a more ambitious negotiation with a more comprehensive focus. 

Will Iran only respond to increasing pressure? What might be its response to increasing pressure?

Dr. Abbas: 

Americans do not understand Iranian culture or history. Even if the economy has retracted 10 percent, 90 percent is viable. Trump has not succeeded in destroying 100 percent of the economy. Iran will resist additional pressure. 

The world has changed. US is not the only superpower. Iran has created relationships with Turkey and Russia that has freed it from dependence on the US dollar. In the long-term, it is better for Iran to have an economy independent of the US and the US dollar. Accordingly, Iran is building relationships in Asia. 

Over history, the international community has used sanctions 120 times. Fifty percent of those sanctions were imposed unilaterally by the US on Iran, Turkey, Russia, etc. 

Iran supports Palestinians ideologically and with financial support. Admittedly, sanctions limit that financial support. 

Iran does not provide financial or military support for the Yemenis. But, the Houthis have learned how to resist the pressure imposed on them by Saudi Arabia. 

How will the ongoing protests in Iraq and Lebanon against sectarian elites aligned with Iran affect regional politics and Iran?

Mr. Ayasrah: 

The protests in Lebanon and Iraq show resentment against the political quota system and sectarianism. These systems are "sugar-coated" democracy. 

Some view these protests as a new Arab Spring after the recent events in Tunisia and Sudan. He is not expecting the protests to result in the formation of any new political systems in these countries. [But see, this story about the resignation of Lebanon's president.  For more on the increasing protests in Iraq, see here.]

Some Arab countries appreciate Iran's influence in the region. But, people are waiting to see what happens between the US and Iran. They need a third-party to help start and manage negotiations. 

The region needs an internal security structure by agreement of regional countries. 

Q&A Session 

Israel plays an important role in the US-Iran relationship. 

Have we seen very different treatments by the US of North Korea as compared to Iran? The US does not show the same belligerence against North Korea. What are the reasons for this policy difference and approach? 

Who benefits from the conflict between the US and Iran? Israel? If the dispute disappears, do Arab countries have a reason to normalize their relationship with Israel? 

What are the domestic politics in Iran? Does the government face the risk of protests? 

What is the role of the CIA in the current policy approach? Did the CIA assassination of the elected prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, in 1953 start the conflict between the US and Iran? [The moderator tried to clarify the historical facts around this event, calling it a coup and not an assassination.] 

What is the impact of the sanctions on energy development and export in Iran? 

Dr. Abbas: 

Iran is still an important player in region. 

Iran has a strong middle class. People have good educations. More people have higher education than in any Arab country. 

People have the right to protest. The government has learned to permit protests and be patient. 

Iran and Iraq, if you look at the Arabic name for each, were a united country in the past. Iran's interest in Iraq is understandable. 

After the coup in 1953 deposing the first democratically-elected prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, the US treated Iran as a rentier state. That led to more internal interference and undermined any opportunity to normalize relations between the US and Iran. 

Before the coup, the countries shared many similarities. 

Iran called the US (not Britain or Russia) the "third force." 

Iranian leaders still hope to normalize the relationship. 

Deputy Director Maloney: 

Trump has been very hostile to North Korea. Has created a fear of military action with catastrophic effect on the region. 

North Korea is the reason no Republican thinks the JCPOA is an answer in Iran. Any agreement needs to be stronger. 

Over 40 years, Tehran has been most resistant to engagement. 

Trump won't put concessions on the table until Iran shows concessions. 

Mr. Ayasrah: 

Iran is a real regional power. US allies are fearful of a strong Iran, including Israel.

Additional Resources

For another summary of the event, see here.

For a history of the negotiations between Iran and the US, see here.

For a list of the sanctions imposed on Iran since 1979, see here.

For more on the need for a regional security structure that includes Iran, see here.

For other posts on this blog about Iran, see here, here, here, and here.

Finally, I want to note that I am working from my notes and apologize in advance if my summary contains any errors or misstatements.  I am happy to make any needed corrections.

Update as of Nov. 24, 2019:  Contrary to the assertions of Dr. Abbas that Iranian leaders are not feeling popular pressure because of the economic effects of U.S. sanctions, reports from the country show increasing unrest, backlash, and protests.

In addition, contrary to the opinion of Mr. Ayasrah that protests in Lebanon and Iraq would not result in political changes, the protests in Lebanon have resulted in political change.  See here for more information about the resignation of the Prime Minister.  In Iraq, the protests are ongoing. See here and here.

Update as of Dec. 7, 2019:  Another prime minister has resigned.  This time following protests in Iraq.  For more on the protests in Iran, see here, here, and here.

Update as of Dec. 21, 2019:  Twelve weeks of protests in Iraq have led to the death of 500 protesters and the injuring of 19,000.  See here.